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Foreign relations is one of the most complex and demanding functions of any
government in the world. It requires a delicate and flexible approach ranging from
diplomatic persuasion to military force to solve a multitude of intricate issues. Conditions
on the world stage shift so often that tactics that worked in the past can fail in the
modern world. Unlike domestic affairs that fall under the direct authority of a nation’s
central government, there is no central authority to manage the international system.
Each state acts as its own player in the most realistic game possible by conducting
business and waging war with its neighbors to achieve desirable outcomes for national
wealth and power. According to proponents of executive authority in foreign policy
however, some players seem to suffer from multiple personality disorder when more
than one institution within the central government voices conflicting opinions on the
course of foreign policy.
In the case of the United States, some scholars believe that the President should
be able to exercise primary authority on the world stage, while Congress takes a back
seat and allows the President to speak with one voice on behalf of the people of the
United States. The problem with this approach is the danger of granting too much power
to any single leader to control the nation’s foreign policy. The Founding Fathers
designed Congress to be responsive to the desires of the people including on matters of
foreign relations. The Constitution specifically outlines numerous powers Congress has
to formulate foreign policy including the power to regulate foreign commerce, control
funding for foreign programs, and declare war. Despite Congress’ Constitutional
authority on foreign policy, years of deference to the President’s Commander in Chief
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power during the first decades following World War II resulted in a large accumulation of
Presidential authority on foreign relations. The horrors of the Vietnam War served as a
wake up call on the problems of unchecked Presidential power and Congress attempted
to correct this imbalance with increased involvement, but the President still retains a
distinct advantage in foreign relations from his ability to veto Congressional legislation,
host foreign diplomats, command the military, and use executive agreements to
substitute treaties that require consent from the Senate.
Despite the President’s advantage, Congress can still affect foreign policy in a
positive manner through a variety of methods ranging from direct legislation to more
indirect and informal tactics that are not as noticeable. Congressional involvement can
vary along two dimensions: more or less active, and deferent or assertive.
Congressional inactivity does not necessarily translate to deference nor does increased
activity mean that Congress opposes the President every time. Congress can be very
active in support of the President or remain less active but choose its battles with the
President on foreign policy. As seen during the Presidency of George W. Bush,
Congress will be more deferent when the President’s proposals have popular support
during a “rally around the flag” situation as a result of the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, but Congress will act more assertively when the President’s
policies, like the occupation of Iraq, lose popularity among the people.
Evaluation of Congressional Involvement in Foreign Policy
To understand effectively the nature of Congress’ role in foreign policy, one must
first sift through and challenge the criticisms made against Congressional involvement.
After one dismisses the negative viewpoints as unwarranted, one can then see the
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variety of methods members of Congress can employ to influence foreign policy in a
positive manner.
Congressional Counterattack
Many in the field of political science hold a negative stigma about the role of
Congress in foreign policy. Most previous studies by these political scientists focus on
the constitutional prerogatives of the President and Congress, gains in authority relative
to the President, or the harm that results from Congress getting involved. James
Lindsay divides these critics into two camps in his book Congress and the Politics of US
Foreign Policy: Irreconcilables and Skeptics. The Irreconcilables are typically
administration officials and their supporters that whole-heartedly support the authority of
the President to speak with one voice on foreign policy matters.1 According to the
Irreconcilables, an “Imperial Congress” only weakens the President’s ability to make
effective decisions on policy and compromises the United States’ position on the world
stage by conveying division, conflict, and disorganization.2 However, Lindsay argues
their fears of an Imperial Congress are exaggerated. Even though Congress does
challenge the President on some occasions, such opposition hardly constitutes a coup
d’état by Congress.3 The President retains control of foreign policy matters regardless
of any challenges made by Congress.4 Presidential dominance has its origins from
decades of Congressional deference fueling the broad interpretation of the Commander
in Chief power beginning after the United States abandoned previous positions of

1

Lindsay, J. M. (1994). Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, pp. 2-3.
2 Lindsay, pp. 2-3.
3 Lindsay, pp. 3.
4 Lindsay, pp. 3.
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isolationism to pursue a leadership role on the world stage following World War II. 5 The
haunting fear of nuclear annihilation by the Soviet Union during the Cold War prompted
Congress to defer to the President on several matters pertaining to foreign policy and
national security.6 The President’s ability to veto legislation from Congress also adds
considerable power to the President on foreign policy matters.
The other group of critics is academic skeptics that question Congress’ ability to
translate foreign policy preferences into legal substance.7 The studies carried out by
skeptics like Barbara Hinckley, author of Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy
Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress, seek to discredit the role of Congress
in foreign policy by citing the inability of Congress to pass substantive legislation directly
outlining its policies.8 Despite Congress’ difficulty in passing bills with actual substance,
Lindsay argues that Congress can affect foreign policy in indirect ways that are more
subtle than and not as noticeable as concrete direct legislation.9 As stated by Ralph
Carter and James Scott in their book, Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional
Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs, Hinckley focuses too much emphasis on formal roll call
votes when Congress has several informal tools that operate below the normal radar. 10
As Rebecca Hersman eloquently stated in her book, Friends and Foes: How Congress
and the President Really Make Foreign Policy,
Dramatic clashes over high-profile issues---“waves”---are important, but they do
not tell all, or even most, of the story. It is in the “ocean”---the day-to-day

5

Lindsay, pp. 21.
Lindsay, pp. 24.
7 Lindsay, pp. 3.
8 Carter, R. G. & Scott, J. M. (2009). Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy
Entrepreneurs. Duke University Press, pp. 7.
9 Lindsay, pp. 3.
10 Carter and Scott, pp. 7-8.
6
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interactions over unexceptional issues---where most foreign policy is shaped,
debated, and made.11
Hinckley also neglects to include the impact Congress’ appropriations power has over
the direction of defense spending on the foreign policy arena.12 Hinckley also makes the
mistake of looking at Congressional involvement in one dimension when Carter and
Scott reveal that Congressional involvement contains two dimensions: active versus
inactive, and assertive versus deferent.13 Stephen Weissman, author of A Culture of
Deference: Congress’ Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy, used Hinckley’s
conclusions to reveal Congress’ deference and argued that Congress needed to get
involved, yet he conceded the fact that individual members can play a role in foreign
policy formation.14 Lindsay, Hersman, Carter and Scott all write about the power
individual members have to greatly influence foreign policy, particularly the members
that are within the committees that have jurisdiction over foreign policy decisions. As
Hersman put it, individual members can serve as leaders of “issue clusters,” which
group together not just members of Congress, but also executive agencies, interest
groups and non-governmental organizations all under one umbrella issue in the foreign
policy arena. In some cases, the strength of this coalition of support can be enough to
induce positive changes in foreign policy.15
Lindsay states that both groups of critics commit three fallacies when discrediting
Congressional involvement in foreign policy. The first is the adversarial fallacy, which

11

Hersman, R. K. C. (2000). Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign
Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 3
12 Carter and Scott, pp. 8
13 Carter and Scott, pp. 10
14 Weissman, S. R. (1995). A Culture of Deference: Congress’ Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy.
New York: BasicBooks, pp. 178-179
15 Hersman, pp. 8.
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assumes that the President and Congress are always fighting each other on the foreign
policy agenda.16 In fact, Lindsay points out that there is often more cooperation than
conflict, especially when Presidential initiatives also appear on the Congressional
agenda.17 Sometimes, the President will ask Congress to weigh in on foreign affairs.18
Congress may appear internally divisive at times, but the executive branch can be just
as fragmented especially when elements of the administration are left out by the
President, which can result in alliances forming between members of Congress and
these disgruntled executive officials that can effectively challenge the President’s
policies.19
The second fallacy is the technocratic fallacy meaning that members of Congress
do not conduct serious oversight initiatives to enforce its policies and are content with a
solitary focus on their legislative work.20 However, Congressional committees often hold
serious hearings to assess the implications of pending foreign policy and execute
oversight against wayward programs, but these hearings sometimes go unnoticed by
the media.21 Oversight hearings also occur less often because the bureaucracies
typically do the right thing when executing policies and investigative panels rarely
uncover critical violations.22 Regardless of their frequency, members of Congress have
strong incentives to use the media when conducting policy oversight to champion a

16

Lindsay, pp. 6-7.
Lindsay, pp. 7.
18 Lindsay, pp. 7.
19 Lindsay, pp. 7.
20 Lindsay, pp. 5.
21 Lindsay, pp. 6.
22 Lindsay, pp. 5.
17
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cause, respond to problems in the implementation of policies, and even indirectly sway
the President’s agenda.23
The last fallacy is the electoral fallacy. Many assume members of Congress will
only focus on reelection and will only act upon the wishes of the voters they represent. 24
The average voter knows very little about the interactions associated with foreign policy
and expresses minimal interest on the subject.25 As a result, members of Congress will
avoid acting seriously on foreign relations because it serves no electoral interest. 26 This
simple electoral explanation discourages Congressional involvement in foreign policy
and validates the following expectations. First, members of Congress will defer to the
President on the substance of foreign policy because constituents lack specific interest
in foreign affairs and support the President on foreign policy issues.27 It would be
politically dangerous for members of Congress to challenge the President because it
would mark them as unpatriotic in the eyes of the average voter. 28 Congressional
members will also only get involved in foreign policy when the issue attracts constituent
interest because of the subsequent domestic impact.29 When Congress does get
involved in foreign policy, members will engage in grandstanding tactics to use the
media to show constituents they care about their interests, but the goal of this media
circus is to win electoral support and not to affect policy substance.30 The problem with
the simple electoral explanation is that none of these expectations played out after the
Vietnam War. The Vietnam War opened the eyes of the American people on the
23

Lindsay, pp. 6.
Lindsay, pp. 3-4.
25 Lindsay, pp. 3.
26 Lindsay, pp. 3-4.
27 Lindsay, pp. 35-36.
28 Lindsay, pp. 35-36.
29 Lindsay, pp. 37.
30 Lindsay, pp. 36-37.
24
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dangers of too much power for the President and the threat of nuclear weapons from
the Soviet Union, but Congress acted in other areas of foreign relations besides
Vietnam and the Soviet Union and remained active long after the war ended.31 Lindsay
argues that the lack of knowledge on foreign policy by the average voter actually allows
members to get more involved in foreign affairs because they are free to pursue their
own policies unburdened by traditional constituent constraints because of voter
disinterest.32 Congressional Members only have to avoid the foreign policy options their
constituents disapprove of, but still have other favorable options to pursue.33 Members
of Congress might have to answer to specific advocacy groups and some interested
constituents, but they generally have leeway to pursue their own ideological interests on
foreign affairs and promote the role of the United States on the world stage as they see
fit.34
Congressional Foreign Policy Tools
James Lindsay groups Congressional actions into three distinctive categories:
direct, substantive legislation, indirect, procedural legislation, and informal, nonlegislative tactics. Direct substantive legislation involves Congress dictating its foreign
policy preferences into traditional legislation. Procedural legislation modifies the
structure and procedure of how foreign policy is made and executed to create
interpretations supported by Congress instead of attacking the actual policy substance.
Informal methods largely refer to the ability of members of Congress to meet with the

31

Lindsay, pp. 38.
Lindsay, pp. 4.
33 Lindsay, pp. 45.
34 Lindsay, pp. 4.
32
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President or foreign dignitaries to discuss foreign policy, and the use of the media by
members of Congress to shape an issue in a favorable light.
Substantive Legislation
Direct legislation is the traditional method Congress uses to enact any of its
policies either domestic or foreign. In general, Congress has tremendous authority to
legislate on several matters because of Congress’ numerous powers outlined in Article
I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. However, legislation on the subject of foreign policy
is more complicated because the President and Congress share powers relating to
foreign policy. Article II, Section 2 names the President Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces with the ability to negotiate treaties and appoint ambassadors to foreign
nations with the advice and consent of the Senate.35 Article II, Section 3 grants the
President the ability to receive foreign ambassadors and other leaders to negotiate
international relations.36 On the other side, Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the
power to control the appropriation of federal funds for international programs, provide
for the common defense, regulate commerce with foreign nations, define and punish
piracies and felonies on the ocean, declare war, raise and support armies, provide and
maintain the navy, and make rules for governing and regulation of land and naval forces
in addition to the ability to provide legislation based upon any of these powers. 37 Despite
Congress’ several powers in the foreign policy arena, a growing trend of broadly
interpreting the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority dating back to the start of the
Cold War placed the President at the helm of making foreign policy decisions. The fear
of nuclear war and total annihilation at the hands of the Soviet Union caused the
35

U.S. Constitution, Art. II § 2.
U.S. Constitution, Art. II § 3.
37 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8.
36
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American people and Congress to put their faith in broad executive authority on the
world stage.38 Members of Congress viewed their roles in foreign policy as supplying
the President with whatever he needed to protect American interests abroad. 39 The
failures of the President during the Vietnam War opened the eyes of the people and
Congress, who now questioned the pervasive threat of Communist expansion and
Presidential authority.40 Although Congress acts more frequently in foreign policy than
years before Vietnam, members of Congress failed to reverse the precedent of
Presidential authority in foreign relations established during the 1950s and 1960s.
Congress now must act in an auxiliary role on foreign policy matters and use whatever
tools it has in its arsenal to modify the President’s agenda to incorporate Congress’
policy preferences.
The three main areas that Congress can legislate on foreign policy are through
declarations of war, regulation of international trade, and appropriations.41 A declaration
of war is the farthest step Congress can take in international relations, which happened
only four times in the history of the United States: the War of 1812, the SpanishAmerican War, World War I, and World War II in addition to a recognition of a state of
war during the Mexican-American War (The Civil War was undeclared because such
recognition would legitimize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation and not an
insurrectionist group).42 Congress can also authorize the use of military force by the
President abroad.43 Due to the rise of the Commander-in-Chief power of the President,
Congress’ war powers diminished in prominence since the broad interpretation of
38

Lindsay, pp. 21.
Lindsay, pp. 23-24.
40 Lindsay, pp. 24.
41 Lindsay, pp. 84.
42 Lindsay, pp. 84-85.
43 Lindsay, pp. 85.
39
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Commander-in-Chief included the ability to decide when and where to commit armed
forces.44 Congress attempted to regain control of the deployment of armed forces
through the War Powers Resolution, but it lacked the teeth necessary to hold the
President accountable for committing armed forces abroad without Congressional
support, and it is political suicide for members of Congress to deny funds to the military
when the lives of American soldiers are on the line.45
Instead of war powers, Congress can use its powers over foreign commerce and
appropriations to influence policy. Rather than arguing over the constitutionality of warrelated decisions made by Congress, most debate over the use of trade powers and the
power of the purse center on political prudence rather than the actual constitutionality of
the action.46 Congress can use its regulation of foreign commerce to reward cooperative
nations with favorable trade agreements while punishing disruptive countries with
economic sanctions.47 Congress’ control over appropriations can greatly influence
foreign programs by controlling how the United States spends its money through
discretionary spending. Through discretionary spending, Congress determines how
much to spend on programs that the President wants, which could be the full amount
requested or none at all.48 Control over military funding could also limit future military
engagements abroad since the military requires Congressional funding to carry out its
operations.49 It may be politically unwise to deny the military funding while operations
are underway, but Congress can prescribe less military funding before war breaks out
as a check against military engagement.
44

Lindsay, pp. 85.
Lindsay, pp. 149.
46 Lindsay, pp. 86, 88.
47 Lindsay, pp. 85.
48 Lindsay, pp. 86.
49 Lindsay, pp. 86-87.
45
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The Senate is in a unique position regarding foreign policy because the
Constitution requires two-thirds approval from the Senate on all treaties and
ambassador appointments made by the President.50 This forces the President to cater
treaties to the preferences of a supermajority of senators in order for a treaty to become
binding, and will concede to the Senate on disagreements concerning the content of the
treaty.51 When the Senate receives a treaty, it can proceed along one of four routes. It
can either approve the treaty, reject it outright thereby killing the treaty, refuse to
consider it and withhold consent to pass it later which is a temporary measure, or
modify the treaty.52 To modify the treaty, the Senate can attach an amendment through
a simple majority or incorporate non-binding reservations and understandings, which
outline how the Senate interprets the treaty and what the agreement entails.53 If these
reservations and understandings are agreed upon, it becomes part of the law. 54 In some
cases, senators can attach amendments or understandings that they know the other
party will reject, which allows the Senate to reject a treaty under the guise of trying to
improve it.55 Since all appropriation bills must start in the House of Representatives, the
House can influence a treaty by denying funds to execute the treaty unless their
preferences are included too.56 Despite the tremendous power Congress, particularly
the Senate, wields over treaties, the President can bypass the Senate with an executive
agreement, which are just as binding and legal as a formal treaty. 57 However, Congress
can counter by requiring executive agreements to be subjected to a joint resolution
50

Lindsay, pp. 77.
Lindsay, pp. 81.
52 Lindsay, pp. 78-80.
53 Lindsay, pp. 80.
54 Lindsay, pp. 81.
55 Lindsay, pp. 81.
56 Lindsay, pp. 87.
57 Lindsay, pp. 81.
51
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made by both chambers in support of the agreement if the issue of the agreement
concerns trade policies or previous legislation that requires Congressional approval
before executing the agreement as seen during the 2006 negotiations between
President George W. Bush and India on a nuclear agreement that required
Congressional authorization to waive portions of the Atomic Energy Act. 58
Despite Congress’ numerous powers to influence foreign policy through
legislation, treaties, and agreements, there are several disadvantages to the traditional
legislative process. The first negative aspect is that some foreign policy matters are
outside Congress’ jurisdiction.59 Congress does not have the power to negotiate abroad
on behalf of the United States, and it cannot compel the President to do so.60 Congress
can try to enact legislation that limits the negotiating leverage of the President, but this
rarely succeeds because of the second inherent drawback.61 Even if Congress can
muster up enough support to pass a bill through both chambers, it must still overcome
one monumental obstacle: a Presidential veto. To override a veto, Congress needs twothirds majorities in both the House and the Senate, which is hard to come by as
Congress becomes more partisan and divided under polarizing party leaderships. The
President can easily prevent a supermajority by persuading only a small minority to
oppose the bill and prevent Congress from obtaining enough votes.62 Congress can
also handcuff itself on the legislative process if there is not a strong enough consensus
that Congress needs to act against the President on foreign policy. 63 Some opposers to

58

Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. U.S. Public Law
109-401. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 18 December 2006.
59 Lindsay, pp. 89.
60 Lindsay, pp. 89.
61 Lindsay, pp. 89.
62 Lindsay, pp. 90.
63 Lindsay, pp. 90.
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action argue that other issues require Congress’ attention, while others feel the
President should take the lead on foreign policy and do not want to challenge a popular
President.64 Lastly, substantive legislation is too rigid and limited to be effective in
international relations.65 World events can easily render legislation moot and outdated.66
In some sensitive cases, diplomacy works best behind closed doors, but legislation is
too public to properly address such conditions.67 Foreign policy requires a flexible
approach that can only be executed by the President, and direct legislation would be
analogous to using a sledgehammer in a situation that requires a scalpel. Legislative
bills also run the risk of being water-downed to reach a compromise in Congress, which
can result in an ineffective law worse than inaction itself.68 Remedies to these
drawbacks often involve giving the President the ability to waive provisions of the law as
he deems necessary, but this involves Congressional concessions of power over
foreign policy to the President.69
Despite the numerous problems of substantive legislation, Congress can turn this
negative into a positive by threatening the President with legislation to draw out
concessions on the substance of foreign policy. Congress can shape legislation to the
point where executive officials will prefer Presidential concessions over Congressional
legislation.70 Congress can also hold other policy topics hostage to force the President
to concede.71 Foreign nations will make conciliatory gestures if it perceives that

64

Lindsay, pp. 90-91.
Lindsay, pp. 91.
66 Lindsay, pp. 91.
67 Lindsay, pp. 92.
68 Lindsay, pp. 92-93.
69 Lindsay, pp. 91.
70 Lindsay, pp. 94.
71 Lindsay, pp. 95.
65
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Congress will threaten to legislate unfavorable trade relations or economic sanctions.72
The use of threats to get concessions assumes that there is room for a compromise
between the two positions and largely depends upon strong Congressional support that
can override a veto to make the threats credible.73 The threat of legislation does have
risks though because the President may not carry out his end of the bargain. 74 Even
worse, Congress can miscalculate the intentions of the President and the law actually
passes resulting in something worse than Congress intended.75 However, so long as
members of Congress can get concessions out of the President on foreign policy
issues, they are willing to let legislative initiatives fail.
Procedural Legislation
Unlike substantive legislation, which dictates the content of foreign policy,
procedural legislation affects the structures and procedures of foreign policy making. 76
In this way, Congress can change policy content by changing the underlying decisionmaking processes.77 Congress can use procedural legislation to mold the bureaucracy
to act upon Congress’ interpretations and preferences in foreign policy content. Several
of these procedural tactics operate outside normal visibility and are overlooked by
skeptics only focusing on major pieces of legislation, or Hersman’s “waves.” The
expansion of scope to include procedural legislation takes into account a larger picture
of the “ocean” itself.
Procedural legislation falls into five categories: creation of new agencies and
executive positions, alteration of the participants in foreign policy decision-making,
72

Lindsay, pp. 95.
Lindsay, pp. 94, 96.
74 Lindsay, pp. 97.
75 Lindsay, pp. 96.
76 Lindsay, pp. 99.
77 Lindsay, pp. 99.
73
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legislative vetoes, new procedural mandates, and reporting requirements.78 Congress
can create new executive agencies to rectify perceived failures in the executive
branch.79 Members of Congress understand that policies without an advocate
organization will die in a bureaucracy and new agencies can be created to champion
the issues Congress supports.80 These new agencies often receive additional clout and
influence when Congress determines how the new agencies will interact with existing
organizations and who answers to whom, which usually leads to Congressionally
supported agencies taking the lead in the bureaucracy.81
Despite the advantages of creating new agencies to conduct foreign policy, the
introduction of new organizations requires a major overhaul of bureaucratic relations.82
Instead, Congress can either remove current agencies from the decision-making
process or add new participants that already exist and favor Congressional
preferences.83 In one instance, Congress can delegate Presidential responsibilities to
an executive agency in sync with the Congressional agenda.84 The President would be
unable to impede upon this group’s operations because he would be viewed as blocking
the mandate of an executive agency that functions within the administration itself.85
Congress can also add private organizations to the policy-making process as advisors
to the President, but also as Congressional watchdogs designed to keep members of
the organization and Congress in the loop of Presidential dealings and the eventual

78

Lindsay, pp. 101.
Lindsay, pp. 102.
80 Lindsay, pp. 102.
81 Lindsay, pp. 102.
82 Lindsay, pp. 103.
83 Lindsay, pp. 103.
84 Lindsay, pp. 103.
85 Lindsay, pp. 103.
79
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effect of foreign policy programs.86 In some cases, Congress can legislate themselves
into the decision-making process by creating commissions composed of members of
Congress to advise the President and even get involved in negotiations with foreign
nations directly while the President is required to keep them up to date on the
proceedings.87
A very powerful procedural provision Congress can use in legislation is the
legislative veto. It gives the President the policies he wants, but Congress reserves the
right to pass a simple (one chamber) or concurrent (both chambers) resolution that
withdraws Congressional support for the legislation if such policies fail, and any
resolution under a legislative veto is immune from a Presidential veto.88 However, the
Supreme Court ruled in the 1983 case, INS v Chadha, that legislative vetoes were
unconstitutional because they violated the spirit of bicameralism and separation of
powers.89 Although Congress revised its laws on a case-by-case basis, several other
laws retained legislative vetoes and Congress continued to incorporate legislative
vetoes into new pieces of legislation despite the court ruling.90 Both Congress and the
President ignore Chadha because both branches prefer legislative vetoes over
substantive legislation because the President gets the green light to execute his policies
while Congress still retains a way to reel in the President if his policies are not
effective.91 If Congress is not satisfied with the progress of Presidential policies or
opposes legislation that is not in effect yet, Congress can pass a joint resolution
blocking the policy even though such resolutions are not immune from a Presidential
86

Lindsay, pp. 103-104.
Lindsay, pp. 104.
88 Lindsay, pp. 105.
89 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
90 Lindsay, pp. 105.
91 Lindsay, pp. 106.
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veto under Chadha.92 However, the President will usually comply with such provisions
because he knows that his policies are more likely to die on Capitol Hill under normal
Congressional procedures than with the attachment of reporting requirements and other
tools Congress uses to remain in the policy loop.93
Congress can use procedural mandates to restrict the actions the President
within acceptable parameters. The President still runs the day-to-day operations of
foreign policy, but Congress constrains what the President can do.94 In some cases,
Congress can grant the President a large amount of discretion to conduct foreign policy,
but can conversely make the operating window so narrow that it is nearly impossible for
the President to avoid limitations from Congress.95 The same tactic also works to limit
the behavior of foreign nations by threatening to withhold foreign aid if foreign countries
stray outside the accepted range outlined by Congress.96
Lastly, one of Congress’ more popular procedural tools is reporting requirements
designed to establish goals that Presidential policies must meet while keeping Congress
up to date on the progress of its implementation.97 There are three variations to
reporting requirements. Notification provisions require the executive branch to inform
Congress whenever it undertakes certain specified actions outlined in the authorizing
legislation.98 Periodic reports require the President to report on the status of programs
at predetermined time intervals or when individual milestones are met. 99 Lastly,
Congress can request one time reports to conduct legislative studies, some of which
92

Lindsay, pp. 106.
LIndsay, pp. 106.
94 Lindsay, pp. 107.
95 Lindsay, pp. 107.
96 Lindsay, pp. 107-108.
97 Lindsay, pp. 108.
98 Lindsay, pp. 108.
99 Lindsay, pp. 108.
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can be used to inform constituents on the possible domestic effects such legislation will
have on them.100 Along with remaining in the loop, reporting requirements allow
Congress to intervene early to curtail Presidential policies when they begin to fail in their
mandates.101 With reporting requirements, Congress can conduct foreign policy
oversight and mobilize Congressional action against Presidential initiatives while
promoting the exchange of information across multiple agencies.102
Despite the several advantages of procedural legislation, there are some flaws
that can unravel the power of procedural legislation, chief among them occurs when the
legislation is too vaguely worded to be effective.103 It is possible to attribute legislative
weakness to members of Congress watering down the bill to get Congressional and
Presidential support and shield themselves from blame if such policies fail.104 Some
members use procedural legislation to make Congress look invisible from the process
for their own protection, but blame avoidance is not enough to fully explain the problems
of procedural legislation. It assumes that constituents are intelligent when it comes to
the demands of Congress, but not the costs of such legislation.105 Interest groups are in
a better position to determine if members of Congress use procedural legislation for
blame avoidance or serious policy formation.106 The vagueness of legislation better
explains its failures, and if procedural legislation is too weak, the President can find
loopholes and maneuver around procedural requirements to achieve the policies he

100

Lindsay, pp. 108.
Lindsay, pp. 109.
102 Lindsay, pp. 109.
103 Lindsay, pp. 113.
104 Lindsay, pp. 113.
105 Lindsay, pp. 113.
106 Lindsay, pp. 113.
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wants without subjecting to Congress.107 The President may follow the limits of the law,
but not act upon the intent of the law by reporting bad news discreetly or making it
harder for Congress to change course.108 Oversight over Presidential actions requires
substantial Congressional time and resources to be effective. As the costs of police
work rise, members of Congress can become less inclined to detect executive noncompliance.109 Some programs, particularly the covert operations of the CIA, are too
secretive for Congress to effectively monitor.110 It can also be very hard for members of
Congress to even prove non-compliance occurred if executive decisions were
judgement calls based upon vague legislation.111 Even if Congress can detect noncompliance, there is a large cost to effectively punish such non-compliance that requires
credible commitments of Congressional resources, which plagued the War Powers
Resolution because it is politically unwise to withhold funding from the military during a
war.112 The executive branch has little incentive to comply to Congressional mandates if
there is no imminent punishment against non-compliance.113 Congress may be able to
derail covert operations by leaking sensitive information, but it is very hard for Congress
to force executive agencies to adopt new policy positions than stop the old ones. 114
Congress can try to hold other programs hostage, but such threats need to be credible
and legitimacy fades when some members are personally invested in some
programs.115 Congress cannot counter executive non-compliance if weak legislation
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allows the President to maneuver around restrictions. Pieces of procedural legislation
that effectively close loopholes are likely to succeed in forcing the President to operate
within the acceptable boundaries Congress establishes.
Informal Non-Legislative Tactics
Congress’ informal, non-legislative practices can be just as effective on foreign
policy issues as substantive and procedural legislation. The first informal tactic is called
Congressional diplomacy, which pertains to members of Congress getting involved in
diplomatic exchanges.116 Some members of Congress can pursue a “Lone Ranger”
approach and conduct their own foreign policy negotiations, but this is very rare
because the Logan Act prevents private American citizens from negotiating with foreign
powers unless specifically authorized by the American government.117 Individual
negotiations run the risk of derailing Presidential policy decisions while making
alternative policies difficult to achieve. To spur positive Congressional involvement in
negotiations, the President can invite members of Congress onto discussion panels as
advisors or Congress can demand the President to include Congress in the
deliberations.118 The President might seek to incorporate Congressional members into
the diplomatic process because members of Congress might be less willing to strike
down the proposals drafted by their colleagues.119 Regardless of Congressional support
for such proposals, the inclusion of Congressional members in diplomatic negotiations
allows Congress to be more involved in the formation of foreign policy. The most
common form of Congressional diplomacy occurs when foreign dignitaries meet with
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members of Congress to exchange information, talk about foreign affairs, and lobby
members for certain policies.120 The President will support such meetings when he can
gain further support for his policies, but such meetings can blur the lines between
informal discussions and Lone Ranger diplomacy.121 By meeting with members of
Congress, foreign dignitaries can gain insight into the modes of operation on Capitol Hill
and how to work the American political system to get what they want, but Congress also
benefits because foreign nations will often have to temper their actions to satisfy the
mood on Capitol Hill and achieve their ends.122 The opposite scenario applies as well
because members of Congress can learn how foreign governments operate and how to
get what they want from other nations.123 Through these informal meetings, both
members of Congress and foreign dignitaries understand what proposals either side will
agree to, and side deals can be made between foreign nations and Congress that can
ultimately bypass the President’s positions.124 With pressures from both foreign nations
and Congress to pursue the same agreement, the President ends up handcuffed into
accepting the side deal made between members of Congress and foreign countries.
Congress can also take on an informal approach to foreign policy through private
consultations with the President. The President might seek out the advice of Congress
to gain political support for his policies, but Congress might have to use legislation or
sheer persistence to get its own involvement in foreign policy negotiations.125 Genuine
dialogue between Congress and the President can be hard to achieve because the
President does not want restrictions on its policies, and members of Congress disagree
120
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on how much involvement the President should extend to Congress.126 Some members
feel that the President only needs to keep Congress in the loop, while others want
Congress to play a larger role, yet both conditions are subject to the willingness of the
President.127 It is easy for the President to seek Congressional advice on policies they
both approve, but the President will be less likely to invite Congress to challenge his
policies.128 Instead of relying upon the President to seek out Congress, members of
Congress have to legislate themselves more involvement and seek out meetings with
the President to discuss foreign policy issues.
The last and most powerful informal tool Congress can use is the ability to frame
the media to gain popular support for certain issues. The increasingly advanced
technologies available allow members of Congress to reach millions of people instantly
and inexpensively.129 The attitudes about media usage are different that in the past.
Previously, members of Congress viewed legislators that sought the public spotlight as
grandstanders.130 However, it has become acceptable and common practice for
members of Congress to use the media and the internet to get their messages out to
their constituents and the other American citizens.131 Congress can use the media to
publicly reveal the problems of the administration’s policies and the need for the general
public to oppose the President’s programs.132 Congress can also use public committee
hearings to bring in expert witnesses that will advocate positions Congress approves on
a public medium like C-SPAN or political news organizations like CNN and Fox News.
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Members of Congress can release Congressional reports to the public and make
speeches on the floor in front of television cameras to support their policy preferences.
If Congress can gather enough popular support for its policies, it can tip the debate
between Congress and the President in Congress’ favor and encourage members of
Congress to pursue a more active role in foreign policy. 133
Although each has its own drawbacks, Congress has several methods it can use
to affect foreign policy. Congress can legislate directly on the substance of foreign
policy based upon its constitutional powers pertaining to declarations of war, regulation
of trade, and appropriations of funds. Congress can also use procedural legislation and
reporting requirements to affect the structures and procedures of decision-making
process of foreign policy and limit the policies the President can do. Lastly, Congress
can employ non-legislative techniques like the media and meetings with foreign leaders
and the President to promote Congress’ foreign policy preferences.
Congressional Involvement in the Foreign Policy of George W. Bush
After one understands the tools Congress can use to influence foreign policy,
one can better analyze specific pieces of legislation and see the role Congress played.
In their book, Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy
Entrepreneurs, Ralph Carter and James Scott used several volumes of Congressional
Quarterly Almanac to code and analyze involvement by individual members of
Congress on several foreign relations issues including foreign policy, defense policy,
appropriations, and international trade and finance.134 Carter and Scott recognized that
individual members interested in foreign policy are able to spearhead initiatives as
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frontrunners to what Hersman defined as “issue clusters.” Carter and Scott’s study
focused on only new introductions of policy and not subsequent pieces of legislation on
spending unless members of Congress raised new issues on such programs.135 Any
single activity on legislation by a member of Congress counted in their study, and some
members engaged in multiple activities on a single piece of legislation.136 Carter and
Scott considered Congressional activity as any one of the following ways Congress
could be involved in foreign policy: introducing legislation and resolutions; proposing
amendments in committees, subcommittees or on the floor; attending committee
hearings; issuing Congressional reports; speaking on the floor or giving public
statements; proposing motions to recommit (or kill) legislation; citing someone for
contempt of Congress; engaging in fact-finding missions; enacting procedures on
legislation; consulting with others on foreign policy; and participating in lawsuits. 137
Considering the data Carter and Scott collected from post-WWII to post-Cold
War, they expected to see more Congressional foreign policy involvement from
individual members during the first decade of the twenty-first century, which
encompasses the Presidency of George W. Bush.138 There would be a slight decrease
in involvement following September 11, 2001, but a resurgence in involvement would
occur afterwards.139 As seen in the following table based upon data for 2003 and 2005,
67 members of Congress engaged in 172 acts of involvement in foreign policy issues. 140
Entrepreneur
Characteristics
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Entrepreneur
Characteristics
# of Entrepreneurs

Overall
Average
33.5

2003

2005

33

34

# of Acts of
Entrepreneurship

86

73

99

This data set excludes 26 freshman members that each engaged in only one act each
because these new members did not establish themselves as entrepreneurs at the start
of their careers.141 If Carter and Scott included the freshman members, there would
have been 87 acts in 2003 and 111 acts in 2005, which only reinforces the conclusion of
a rise in Congressional involvement between 2003 and 2005.142 The average number of
members getting involved in foreign policy rose from the post-Cold War 1990s which
averaged only 26.2 active members.143 The average number of acts between the two
periods actually dropped from 106 to 86.144 Based upon this data, one can expect to
find that 2002 marked a low point of Congressional involvement in foreign policy and
Congress became steadily more active as time passed with larger numbers of
involvement predicted for 2006, 2007, and 2008 due to the controversies of the Iraq
War and the subsequent shift of Congressional control over to the Democratic party
following the 2006 elections.145
Carter and Scott’s data proved several of their predictions to be accurate.
Individual members of Congress became increasingly active as time passed to
incorporate their preferences into foreign policy. Carter and Scott’s data paints the trend
of a more deferential Congress during Bush’s first term, and a more active and assertive
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Congress during Bush’s second term first among the Republican majority and then
among the subsequent Democratic majority.
However, Carter and Scott’s data focuses on the activities of individual members
and not the collective work of Congress. It is also unclear what specific actions Carter
and Scott coded and what the outcomes of such actions were. Under their parameters,
if a member of Congress speaking at a hearing is a single Congressional initiative, then
ten members speaking at the same hearing could be coded as ten distinct initiatives.
Individual actions are a major component of Congressional involvement in foreign
policy, but they do not give the broader picture necessary to determine the level of
activity and assertiveness from Congress as an institution.
The use of Congressional Quarterly Almanac by Carter and Scott is a good
baseline to analyze how Congress acted on major foreign policy legislation, but it is not
enough to get a larger picture of Congressional involvement because it omits the
activities of committees to conduct hearings, particularly oversight hearings that allow
members of Congress to challenge the practices of the executive branch. An effective
study of Congressional involvement in foreign policy should not focus on just the entries
in the 2001-2008 volumes of Congressional Quarterly Almanac pertaining to foreign
relations, defense, trade, and related appropriations. It should also include the hearings
and investigative prints featured in the CIS Index for the committees that have
jurisdiction over foreign policy, which are the House and Senate Foreign Affairs and
Armed Services Committees along with the related subcommittees under the
Appropriations Committee. The combination of legislation from Congressional Quarterly
Almanac and the non-legislative activity in CIS Index will better reveal Congressional
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involvement in foreign policy during the Presidency of George W. Bush. After each
period’s legislative history will follow a table outlining the use of Lindsay’s Congressional
foreign policy tools, the average amount Congress used each tool per year, and the
percentage of successes for assertive pieces of legislation. Another table will reveal the
number of hearings and investigative prints of each of the foreign policy committees for
that time period, the average amount of committee activity, and how many hearings
were oversight hearings. The full tables detailing each provision in the legislative
histories, which serves as the foundations for the featured Congressional policy tools
tables, will be outlined in the Appendix.
2001-2004: Congressional Deference
The terrorist attacks that hit the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia on September 11, 2001 devastated the United States
and left its citizens in a state of paralyzing shock, mournful sorrow, and heated anger.
Sadness and rage soon transformed into a surging wave of patriotism and popular
support for President George W. Bush and his national security policies to rid the world
of terrorism. September 11th is an example of a “rally-‘round-the-flag” effect, which
occurs when a national leader takes advantage of patriotic feelings during a crisis
situation to gather popular support for specific policies.146 In response, members of
Congress began deferring to President Bush on several foreign policy issues because
members of Congress did not want to appear disloyal or unsupportive of a popular
President during a time of crisis in the eyes of their constituents. The broad authority
Bush received a week after the attacks to conduct military operations against al-Qaeda
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and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is a clear indication of Congressional deference
to a popular President. Congress passed 420-1 in the House and 98-0 in the Senate the
authorization of the use of military force and granted Bush the authority to
Use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.147
In prior authorizations for war, Congress never gave the President the broad authority to
use force against organizations or individuals to prevent future attacks, and the wording
of this legislation presented Bush a green light to launch a global “war on terror”
beginning with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.
Simultaneously, Congress unanimously passed an emergency supplemental
appropriations bill that granted a total of $40 billion for recovery, relief aid, and defense
reinforcement in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.148 Bush immediately received $10
billion to spend at his discretion, $5.9 billion of which went to defense programs. 149 Bush
also received an additional $10B after submitting his proposals to Congress for
spending the money, and Bush committed $8.1 billion more to defense.150 Congress
authorized the other $20 billion in the Fiscal Year 2002 Appropriations Bill. A few
months later, Congress gave the President the ability to waive sanctions against
147
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Pakistan and provide foreign aid to Pakistan for the purpose of building an alliance to
conduct military operations in Afghanistan.151 In exchage for Congressional support,
Bush needed to certify that economic aid to Pakistan would foster democratic rule in the
country.152 By the end of 2001, the United States was at war with the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and President Bush had the support of patriotic American citizens and a
deferential Congress.
After scoring a political victory with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
President Bush set his sights on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Many in the Bush
administration believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and Bush
thought he already had legal justification to pursue war against Iraq due to its failures to
comply with United Nations sanctions, but Bush conceeded and announced he would
appear before Congress and the UN to seek approval for a military invasion of Iraq. 153
Bush negotiated the language of the resolution before it landed in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and drafted legislation granting him the authority to use force to
defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq, and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq.154
Bush agreed to drop language calling on the United States to “restore international
peace and security to the region” because many Congressional members feared that
151
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this could justify military action elsewhere.155 Bush also agreed to certify that diplomacy
could not solve this problem and to seek UN approval despite it not being required. 156
When Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SC) wanted more clarity in the
legislation about Bush’s authority under the law and specific requirements to use
peaceful tactics before war, Bush broke off negotiations with the Senate and struck a
new deal with House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and persuaded House
Internaitonal Relations Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL) to call a mark up hearing as added
pressure on Gephardt.157 Gephardt stunned many Democrats with his deal with
President Bush, but Gephardt did not want to look to weak on national security as he
planned out his future Presidential campaign for 2004.158 Gephardt stated he regretted
not voting for the Persian Gulf War in 1991, but others felt that anti-war Democrats Jim
McDermott (D-WA) and Daivd Bonior (D-MI) embarrassed him with their disapproval for
Bush’s policy towards Iraq.159 The International Relations Committee reported out a bill
that gave Bush the latitude he wanted to conduct military operations in Iraq, but needed
to report to Congress within sixty days of the start of hostilities instead of the ninety
days Bush proposed.160 Despite several concerns emerging during floor debates about
the coming war in Iraq, many Democrats voted for the bill to avoid looking weak on
security and appear unpatriotic to their constituents because they opposed a popular
President. Bush praised the bipartisan votes of 296-133 in the House and 77-23 in the
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Senate as America speaking with one voice.161 Two months after the bill passed, the
UN Security Council gave its approval for a resolution giving Iraq one more chance to
comply with UN mandates.162 Bush supported the resolution, but told the UN that the
United States would make its own determination of Iraqi compliance and would act
independently if necessary.163 On March 20, 2003, Bush finally launched the invasion
and occupation of Iraq as authorized by the broad legislation Congress approved.
When startling evidence of abuse and torture surfaced out of Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq, the House and Senate each passed a non-binding resolution condemning the
abuses and calling for a Congressional investigation.164 However, the House and
Senate Armed Services, International Relations, and Judiciary Committees all shot
down resolutions requesting the Bush administration to provide documents on the
abuses for investigation.165 The foreign policy committees stepped aside on the issue
and left the investigation up to the Pentagon and military officials.
Despite the amount of Congressional deference to President Bush following
September 11th, Congress did enact one assertive piece of legislation involving
sanctions against Syria. Bush opposed the imposition of sanctions on Syria, but
members of Congress were upset over Syria’s tolerance of terrorism by granting
terrorists the ability to cross its borders to launch attacks in Iraq against the American
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occupation forces.166 Other members of Congress protested Syria’s occupation of its
neighbor, Lebanon, and its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction.167
Many pro-Israel interest groups, including the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee
lobbied hard for Congressional sanctions, and Bush eventually dropped his objections
to sanctions because of Syria’s failure to halt terrorism and assist in the Middle East
peace process.168 Bush also probably supported the legislation because there was
enough Congressional support to override a Presidential veto based upon the final vote
totals: 398 to 4 in the House, 89 to 4 in the Senate, and 408 to 8 in the House to
approve the Senate’s amendment to the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act of 2003. The legislation banned the exportation of “dual use items” to
Syria, which are commerical items that also have military applications.169 Congress also
required the President to impose any two of the following sanctions: halting all US
exports to Syria except food and medicine, prohibiting investment in Syria by American
companies, restricting Syrian diplomats to a 25 mile radius around New York City and
Washington, DC, banning all Syrian aircraft from US airspace, reducing diplomatic
contacts, and freezing Syrian assets in the US.170 The State Department had to also
keep Syria on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the sanctions would be lifted
only when Syria withdrew from Lebanon, ended its support of terrorism, and halted its
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programs for weapons of mass destruction.171 However, the President still reserved the
ability to waive the sanctions if there was a compelling national security interest, but
Bush needed to report to Congress on his reasons for waiving the sanctions.172
2001-2004

# of actions # of deferent # of assertive # of successful assertive
actions
actions
actions for Congress

Substantive
Procedural
Informal
Congressional
Procedure
Total
Average Per
Year

% of successful
assertive actions for
Congress

14
3
2
2

5
0
1
1

9
3
1
1

3
1
1
0

33.33%
33.33%
100%
0%

21
5.25

7
1.75

14
3.5

5
1.25

35.71%
35.71%

The table above describes a less active and deferent Congress. In total,
Congress acted on foreign policy only 21 times from 2001-2004, most of which
consisted of substantive pieces of legislation. Although Congress initiated more
assertive actions than deferent ones, only 35% of those assertive pieces of legislation
were successful. There were more deferent actions than successful assertive ones
which confirms the deferent attitude Congress adopted during the first term of President
Bush. The deferent legislation that Congress enacted granted Bush considerable power
to act upon his policy preferences, particularly the broad ability to launch two wars.
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Committee
Committee
Activity Activity Per Year

House Armed
Services
House Foreign
Affairs

83

38

45.78%

2

85

21.25

320

38

11.88%

20

340
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Committees (20012004)

Hearings

Oversight
Hearings

% of
Oversight
Hearings

Investigative
Prints

Total
Average
Committee
Committee
Activity Activity Per Year

House
Appropriations
Defense
Subcommittee

11

0

0%

0

11

2.75

House
Appropriations
Foreign Operations
Subcommittee

23

0

0%

1

24

6

Senate Armed
Services
Senate Foreign
Relations
Senate
Appropriations
Defense
Subcommittee

66

23

34.85%

1

67

16.75

192

52

27.08%

26

218

54.5

6

0

0%

0

6

1.5

Senate
Appropriations
Foreign Operations
Subcommittee

4

0

0%

0

4

1

Totals
Average Per Year

705
176.25

151
37.75

21.42%
21.42%

50
12.5

755
188.75

188.75
----

The activity from the foreign policy committees also paints the picutre of a less
active and deferent Congress. The levels of activity from the House and Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Affairs Committees far exceeded the amount of activity from the
Appropriations Subcommittees. The hearings that the Appropriations Subcommittees
held all pertained to purely legislative matters unlike the several oversight hearings
conducted by the other committees. Congress as a whole averaged approximately 188
informal actions within the committees, with a vast majority of such actions consisting of
Congressional hearings. Despite Congress’ occasional oversight hearings, only 21% of
all committee hearings involved oversight of previous foreign policy programs. Not only
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did Congress grant the President tremendous power to pursue his policies, but
Congress also did not hold the President responsible for his policy choices either.
Although Congress was able to be assertive on Syria, this represented a minor
divergence from the trend of Congressional deferrence to President Bush on foreign
policy issues that dominated the first term of the Bush Presidency. Members of
Congress granted Bush broad authority to launch military campaigns in both
Afghanistan and Iraq because the President enjoyed the popular support of patriotic
Americans that wanted Bush’s policies to fight terrorism and rogue regimes. Congress
could not oppose Bush on foreign policy because such opposition would label them as
unsupportive and traitors to their constituents. As Bush’s policies began to lose support
during his second term however, Congress gained an opportunity to reassert itself and
get back into the game of foreign policy formation.
2005-2006: Rise of Congressional Assertiveness
By the start of President Bush’s second term, approval for the President and the
occupation of Iraq was fading rapidly. Many American soldiers returned home in
bodybags while reports of mismanagement and lies about the justifications for war
caused disillusionment among the American public. Congressional Republicans in the
majority watched as Bush’s approval ratings plummetted and sought to avoid going
down with the ship by curbing the authority they granted Bush during the first term. A
popular battlefield for Congress to oppose the President occurred on defense
appropriation and authorization bills. In 2005, the defense approrpriations bill was $4.4
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billion less than Bush requested excluding the wartime supplement.173 Congress agreed
to meet Bush’s proposed $1.1 billion for research and $716 million for new destroyers,
but did so by trimming funds for Future Combat Systems, Transformational Satellite
Communications, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.174 The related defense authorization
bill called for $290 million less than Bush asked and authorized an emergency $50
million for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq until Bush submitted a supplemental request
in 2006.175 Congress used the defense authorization bill as a means of conducting
oversight on Bush’s policies towards the conduct of the Iraq War and treatment of
detainees. Congress required President Bush to submit quarterly reports on the
progress of the reconstruction of Iraq and on benchmarks leading to American
withdrawal.176 Bush wanted $441.8 billion for operations, maintence and personnel in
Iraq, but Congress spent the money on weapons procurement and research and
development while leaving Bush with $1.2 billion less than what he wanted for
operations and maintence.177 Congress wanted to control costs on weapons and limit
spending and mismanagement by the Pentagon. As a result, Congress capped the
costs of destroyers, submarines, and Littoral Combat Ships, while forcing the military to
fully justify the importance of Future Combat Systems before spending money on the
program and requiring the Pentagon to reform its financial management systems before
173
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it could conduct its own audits.178 Under the authorization bill, Congress granted
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba a limited right to appeal their detentions and Sen.
John McCain (R-AZ) added an amendment banning the abusive treatment of terror
suspects.179 Bush strongly opposed McCain’s amendment and threatened to veto both
the appropriations bill and the authorization bill unless Congress removed the
amendment.180 However, Bush backed down to McCain because there was enough
support in both chambers of Congress to override a veto and the appropriations and
authorization bills both passed by large margins.
The following year saw continued Congressional opposition to Bush’s requests in
defense appropriations and authorization. Under the 2006 defense appropriations bill,
the Department of Defense received $377.6 billion, but Congress categorized most of
the funds as discretionary spending under the control of Congress.181 Only $256 million
of the total amount was not discretionary, and the final total was $4.1 billion less than
Bush requested.182 Bush threatened to veto any bill that was $4 billion less than what he
requested, but the Senate ignored his threat and cut an additional $200 million as a
result. The appropriations bill also halted the conversion of nuclear missiles into
conventional missiles and ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Joe Biden (D-DE) added a provision prohibiting any permanent bases in
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Iraq.183 On the 2006 defense authorization bill, Republican senators on the Armed
Services Committee challenged President Bush on several issues including military
personnel and their families, the conduct of the Iraq War, and plans to purchase
weaponry.184 The Armed Services Republicans wanted more Americans in uniform with
higher wages and more health care benefits.185 They also added $20 billion for new
armor for soldiers and vehicles and denied Bush less funds for Future Combat Systems
and the F-35, while authorizing unrequested funds for ships, submarines, and
warplanes to be stationed in the home states of the senior Armed Services Committee
members.186 Despite claiming some provisions to be optional, Bush had to comply with
these proposals because both appropriations and authorization bills passed by margins
greater than the number required to override his veto.
The Supreme Court ruled in the 2006 case Hamdan v Rumsfeld that detainees in
Guantanamo Bay had the right to appeal their detentions in American courts.187
President Bush resisted the Court’s decision based upon the language of the military
authorization for Afghanistan and argued that al-Qaeda members warranted exceptions
to the protections of the Geneva Convention.188 However, Bush conceded to the
Supreme Court and began working on a draft with Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (RTN) to create military tribunals for the detainees’ trials, but Sens. John Warner (R-VA),
183
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Lindsay Graham (R-SC), and John McCain, all Republican members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, opposed several provisions Bush attempted to put in the
legislation.189 Bush’s version of the bill reinterpreted the United States’ obligations under
the Geneva Convention to allow torture of suspects, allowed the use coerced evidence
during the trial in addition to classified evidence the defendants could not see, and
permitted trials to occur without the defendant present in the court.190 Despite a
contentious lobbying campaign from the White House, the trio of senators used their
military backgrounds to win enough Congressional support to oppose Bush’s bill and
forced the President to concede some provisions.191 Bush agreed to drop the ability to
reinterpret the Geneva Convention and the ability to use classified evidence in trials.192
Other members of Congress approved of the provision calling war crimes grave
breaches of the Convention, but Bush managed to secure immunity from prosecution
for the CIA agents that tortured terror suspects overseas.193 Several Democrats and a
few Republicans however, opposed the continued ability to use coerced evidence for
trials and the absence of habeus corpus rights for detainees during the military
tribunals.194 Despite discontent over the remaining provisions Bush advocated, three
Republican senators launched an effective challenge against the policies of the
President and emerged victorious.

“Deal Reached on Military Tribunals,” pp. 5-9.
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In June of 2006, President Bush wanted to negotiate a nuclear agreement with
India to build an alliance with India and exchange nuclear materials. However, India did
not sign the UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a transfer of nuclear materials
from the United States to a nation that did not comply with the treaty was prohibited
under the Atomic Energy Act. To make the agreement work, Bush had to waive
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India, but to do this he needed the
approval of Congress who demanded a substantial level of involvement in the
negotiations.195 Bush agreed to make the agreement with India subject to a joint
resolution of support from Congress in addition to reporting requirements Congress
attached to keep it in the loop on the progress of the deal.196 Congress also reserved
the right to call off the agreement if India detonated a nuclear weapon or broke any
other agreement calling for non-proliferation.197
2005-2006

Substantive
Procedural
Informal
Congressional
Procedure
Total
Average Per
Year

# of actions # of deferent # of assertive
actions
actions

# of successful
assertive actions for
Congress

% of successful assertive
actions for Congress

20
4
1
4

3
0
1
0

17
4
0
4

13
4
0
1

76.47%
100%
--25%

29
14.5

4
2

25
12.5

18
9

72%
72%

The first half of President Bush’s second term marks a complete reversal of
Congressional involvement in foreign policy. Congressional foreign policy activity
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jumped to levels nearly three times more than during the first term with a significant
increase of four times as many assertive actions. Not only did Congress act more
assertively during this period, but Congress was also more successful in getting their
policy preferences into law with a substantial jump in success rates from 35% to 72%.
Members of Congress watched as President Bush’s policies began to unravel in 2005
because of the power they granted previously. Members of Congress, particularly
Republicans in the majority, took themselves off the legislative bench to reassert their
roles in foreign policy and correct the American trajectory on foreign relations.
Committees (20052006)

Hearings

Oversight
Hearings

% of
Oversight
Hearings

Investigative
Prints

Total
Average
Committee
Committee
Activity Activity Per Year

House Armed
Services
House Foreign
Affairs
House
Appropriations
Defense
Subcommittee

63

44

69.84%

1

64

32

141

49

34.75%

8

149

74.5

1

0

0%

3

4

2

House
Appropriations
Foreign Operations
Subcommittee

12

1

8.33%

0

12

6

Senate Armed
Services
Senate Foreign
Relations
Senate
Appropriations
Defense
Subcommittee

42

16

38.10%

0

42

21

69

27

39.13%

27

96

48

5

0

0%

0

5

2.5

Senate
Appropriations
Foreign Operations
Subcommittee

4

0

0%

0

4

2

Totals
Average Per Year

337
168.5

137
68.5

40.65%
40.65%

39
19.5

376
188

188
----

Although the levels of committee activity remained relatively unchanged on
average, the quality of these informal actions shows a more assertive Congress at work.

Congressional Foreign Policy

44

There were some increases and decreases among the individual committees, but it
adds up to similar levels of committee activity seen during Bush’s first term. The
Appropriations Subcommittees continued to conduct mainly hearings on legislative
matters while the traditional committees handled the bulk of policy hearings and
oversight. The percent of oversight hearings doubled from 21% to over 40% and the
average number of investigative prints rose from 12.5 to 19.5. Instead of a quantitative
increase in committee activity, Congressional foreign policy committees conducted
more qualitative oversight hearings designed to check the President’s policies and rein
back the mismanagements and failures that occurred during a period of deference to a
once popular President.
The beginning of Bush’s second term involved a resurgence of Congressional
assertiveness on foreign policy. After Congress saw the failures of the President’s
policies and the problems of broad executive authority in foreign policy, Congress used
the tools in its arsenal, mainly discretionary spending, to curb back the wasteful defense
spending and mismanagment of the Iraq War. Congress also checked Presidential
policies regarding detainees in Guantanamo Bay and kept Bush on a short leash during
the nuclear negotiations with India. The fading popular support for Bush’s policies gave
Congress the window it needed to assert itself and correct the failing policies of
President Bush that Congress allowed when President had the patriotic support that
September 11th created.
2007-2008: Democratic Congress
The elections of 2006 proved to be historic because the Democratic Party scored
major electoral victories and secured both chambers of Congress for the first time since
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the Democrats lost control of Congress during the Republican victories of the 1994
elections. Part of the Democrats successes can be explained by the failures of
President George W. Bush on the Iraq War which created intense anti-Republican
attitudes that dominated the electoral atmosphere. Many voters began equating the Iraq
War with the Vietnam War as military quagmires in foreign countries. A major part of the
Democratic campaign platform was the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and an end to a
long and exhaustive war.
Despite the ambitious agenda of the Democrats, they had little success enacting
legislation calling for troop withdrawals because the remaining Republicans rallied
behind President Bush and denied the Democrats the support needed to overcome not
just the filibuster in the Senate, but the Presidential veto as well. Congress first tried to
establish a deadline of most of American forces out of Iraq by August of 2008, but the
Senate compromised on setting the date as a goal to strive for rather than a formal
deadline.198 The House agreed to the lesser version of H.R. 1591 because members of
the House knew that the stricter bill they wanted would fail. Despite the bill passing the
Senate, Bush vetoed H.R. 1591 and the House failed to gather two thirds approval for
an override of the veto.199 The Democrats proposed another bill without a time table, but
threatened to withhold funds for the war unless Bush reported on the progress of the
Iraqi government.200 However, the Democrats backed down when Bush made speeches
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during Memorial Day about the need for more troops in Iraq to finish the job.201
Reluctantly, the Democrats gave Bush the funding he wanted for the Iraq War, but
outlined eighteen benchmarks the Iraqi government had to meet and required Bush to
report on the progress.202 The Democrats tried again when the President requested a
$50 billion supplement to hold over the Department of Defense until Bush requested
more funds for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.203 In H.R. 4156, Congress required the
withdrawal of troops to begin within thirty days of enactment with the goal of most of the
troops out of Iraq by December 15, 2008.204 The Defense Department could leave some
troops in Iraq, but only for the purposes of conducting counterterrorist efforts, protecting
U.S. personnel, and training the Iraqi military to take over.205 The bill also required
complete military training for soldiers in Iraq and a prohibition on the torture of
detainees.206 However, the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the bill after it passed the
House, and Bush threatened to veto the Democrats’ omnibus spending bill unless they
conceded to the President on Iraq.207 The Democrats agreed to add $31 billion in the
2008 appropriations for Afghanistan only, but the Senate reworked the bill and
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expanded the amount to $70 billion for either Iraq or Afghanistan while leaving out a
timetable for troop withdrawal in Iraq.208
Despite their failure on withdrawing troops from Iraq, the Democratic Congress
managed to scoring some successes against Bush on other parts of foreign policy.
Congress continued its practices of denying Bush the funding he requested in the
defense appropriations and authorization bills. The appropriations bill for the Fiscal Year
2008 left out emergency funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because the
Democrats were reluctant to fund the war in Iraq unless there were major policy
changes, but ultimately left this issue out to deal with in the aforementioned bills so that
they could pass the appropriations bill. The total amount Congress approved was
$459.6 billions of which $459.3 billion was discretionary, and the total amount was $3.4
billion less than Bush asked for.209 The Democrats used the appropriations bill to shift
the priorities of defense spending towards more combat equipment, military training,
battle gear for the National Guard and Army Reserve, and support for military families
while allocating less for futuristic combat vehicles, weapons, and missile defense. 210
The defense authorization granted $500 billion in national security, but Congress
rewrote the spending plans of President Bush to mirror their preferences of weapon
procurement, personnel policy, military health care, and regulation of private defense
contractors.211 However, Bush vetoed the original version of the bill because the Iraqi
government opposed one of the provisions in the bill allowing lawsuits against the Iraqi
208
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government, even if such injustices occurred under Saddam Hussein.212 As a result, the
Democrats granted the President the ability to waive the provision to satisfy the Iraqi
government.213
The defense appropriations for the next year continued to deny President Bush
the amount of funding he requested. The fiscal year 2009 appropriations bill allocated
$4 billion less than Bush requested while providing less for futuristic weapons and
missile defense and more for the replacement of equipment for Iraq.214 The
appropriations bill also allocated $452 million less for military personnel, $1.9 billion less
for operations and maintenance, and $1.1 billion less for weapons procurement.215
Congress diverted the cut funding away from these programs and towards the Defense
Health Program and research and development.216 The related defense authorization
bill allocated $611.1 billion which was $1.4 billion less than Bush requested and nearly
all of the cuts came out of the $70 billion Bush requested for Irag and Afghanistan. 217
Again Congress denied increased funding for futuristic weapons and missile defense
and used the money for equipment in Iraq.218 However, Congress left out several
provisions that Bush threatened to veto the legislation over including bans on the use of
private contractors for interrogations and combat operations, the requirement of
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videotaping interrogations, and the necessity of Congressional approval for any future
commitments of troops in Iraq.219 Other provisions that Bush opposed remained in the
bill. Under the authorization bill, the Pentagon could not use funds for infrastructure
projects in Iraq, establish permanent bases, control over oil resources. 220 The Iraqi
government also needed to share the costs of joint military operations, the Pentagon
needed to report on their detention operations in Iraq, and the President had to submit
reports concerning Iran’s nuclear program.221 In the President’s signing statement, Bush
indicated that he reserved the right to disregard certain provisions, namely the ban on
the use of funds to control oil resources in Iraq, and requirement of Iraq to share the
costs of military operations with the United States.222 Despite previous concessions, the
President scored a victory for himself by getting more than he requesting in
supplemental war funding. Congress authorized $186.5 billion in unrestricted funding for
Iraq and Afghanistan operations, even though Bush asked for only $183.9 billion.223 The
House managed to pass a provision requiring withdrawals to begin within thirty days of
enactment and end by December 31, 2009, but the Senate stripped the bill of all
restrictions to pass the bill.224
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Although the Democrats did not enjoy as much success at their Republican
predecessors did against Bush, they were able to enact some important pieces of
legislation in foreign policy. The Democrats managed to force Bush to make revisions to
the proposed trade agreement with Peru on labor and environment protections in order
to get enough support for passage in Congresss.225 The Democrats also increased the
severity of breaking the existing International Emergency Economic Powers Act to put
more pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear program. Under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Enhancement Act, Congress increased the penalties on American
companies for conducting business with sanctioned nations from $50,000 to $250,000
or double the amount of the transaction depending upon which amount was higher.226
The criminal penalties for such business also increased from $250,000 in fines and ten
years imprisonment to $1 million in fines and twenty years imprisonment. 227 The bill also
left out any indications of a possible military strike against Iran.228 The House attempted
to pass a stricter bill that banned all imports from Iran, labeled the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard as a terrorist group for the purpose of freezing their assets abroad, and removed
the ability of President Bush to waive the existing sanctions from 2006 while expanding
the list of industries that could be punished under the bill, but these provisions failed in
the Senate.229
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After two years of negotiations, Congress revisted the nuclear deal with India for
final authorization. The United States agreed to trade nuclear material with India while
India agreed to the preconditions of international regulators like the IAEA and United
States law.230 In order for Bush to make this deal, he needed to gain Congressional
approval to waive provisions of the Atomic Energy Act that prohibited trading nuclear
materials with non-signatories of the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty.231 Bush followed the
conditions outlined in the 2006 law by reporting that India’s civilian program would be
separate from its military program, India would allow the IAEA to send inspectors and
implement safeguards, and India would be exempt from the restrictions of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.232 Congress agreed to the pact with India, but included the ability to
conduct oversight on any future nuclear agreement with India concerning the
reprocessing of nuclear fuel.233
2007-2008

Substantive
Procedural
Informal
Congressional
Procedure
Totals
Average Per
Year

230

# of actions # of deferent # of assertive # of successful assertive % of successful assertive
actions
actions
actions for Congress
actions for Congress
27
11
0
5

7
0
0
0

20
11
0
5

9
8
0
2

45%
72.73%
--40%

43
21.5

7
3.5

36
18

19
9.5

52.78%
52.78%
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The latter portion of the Bush Presidency witnessed mixed results for
Congressional involvement in foreign policy. The average amount of legislative activity
from Congress rose again and doubled from 14.5 to 21.5. Although the number of
assertive actions increased, the success rate for these policies dropped from 72% to
52%. Despite this drop in successful assertiveness, Congress continued to be more
assertive and successful on its agenda than during its period of deference during Bush’s
first term. The increased amount of activity from Congress and the decreased
successes stems from several of Congress’ attempts to establish a plan on the highly
contentious issue to withdraw troops from Iraq. Although the Republicans challenged
Bush in 2005 and 2006 to reform of the conduct of the Iraq War, a full withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Iraq was not on their agendas. When the Democrats adopted the
primary foreign policy agenda of withdrawals from Iraq, the remaining Republicans
rallied behind President Bush and blocked any attempt to end the war.
Committees (20072008)

Hearings

Oversight
Hearings

% of
Oversight
Hearings

Investigative
Prints

Total
Average
Committee
Committee
Activity Activity Per Year

House Armed
Services
House Foreign
Affairs
House
Appropriations
Defense
Subcommittee

162

100

61.73%

10

172

86

217

69

31.80%

7

224

112

4

0

0%

2

6

3

House
Appropriations
Foreign Operations
Subcommittee

5

0

0%

1

6

3

Senate Armed
Services
Senate Foreign
Relations

49

20

40.82%

3

52

26

73

25

34.25%

26

99

49.5
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Senate
Appropriations
Defense
Subcommittee

5

0

0%

0

5

2.5

Senate
Appropriations
Foreign Operations
Subcommittee

2

0

0%

0

2

1

Totals
Average Per Year

517
285.5

214
107

41.39%
41.39%

49
24.5

566
283

283
----

The committee actions during the last two years of the Bush Presidency
coincides with the legislative activity in Congress. The average number of hearings and
investigative prints rose to 285 and 24.5 respectively leading to a rise in the average
amount of informal committee activity by nearly 100 actions with most of the work
coming from the traditional foreign policy committees and not the Appropriations
Subcommittees. However, the number of oversight hearings remained static at around
41%. Instead of the qualitative increase between Bush’s first term and the first half of
the second term, there was a quantitative increase between the first and second halves
of the second term.
Under Democratic control, Congress continued the trend of assertiveness started
by the Republicans in 2005 against President Bush, but ultimately failed to enact their
policy preferences due to the partisan politics that dominated contentious issues like
withdrawal from Iraq. The Democrats managed to claim some foreign policy victories on
appropriations, trade agreements with Peru, sanctions against Iran, and limitations on
the nuclear deal with India and specific provisions concerning Iraq, but the power of
Bush’s veto and his support from the Republican party prevented the Democrats from
achieving their major foreign policy goals of withdrawal from the Iraq War. The
Democrats had to wait until their Democratic Presidential candidate, Sen. Barack
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Obama (D-IL), won the Presidency in 2008 to achieve their goals scaling back troops
from Iraq.
Conclusion
On foreign policy issues, Congress is more likely to defer to the President when
the President has popular support for his policies. Congress gave President Bush the
policies he wanted because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 created a “rally
‘round the flag” effect that instilled patriotic passions among the American electorate
and support for Bush’s national security policies and the global “war on terrorism.” The
President already enjoys inherent advantages on foreign policy issues due to his
powers to command the armed forces, negotiate with foreign dignitaries, and veto
Congressional legislation, but the added support of the people makes it very difficult for
members of Congress to oppose the President on foreign policy without appearing
unpatriotic to their constituents. As a result, Congress took the deferent route and
granted the President the policies he requested. When the President’s policies lose the
support of the people and began to fail, as they did during the occupation of Iraq,
Congress can pursue a more assertive foreign policy approach and challenge the
President. In order to maintain Congressional levels of assertiveness, Congress needs
to have a strong majority to overcome the President’s other advantages, which
Congress obtained in 2005 to correct the conduct of the Iraq War, but lost it in 2007
when the Democrats changed the Iraq agenda from correction to withdrawal. When
Congress does get involved in foreign policy, it can use a wide variety of tools ranging
from the traditional direct legislation to the more subtile use of procedural legislation and
informal non-legislative tactics. The sucess of a Congressional challenge to Presidential
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policies largely depends upon the ability of Congress to gather enough support to
override a Presidential veto, which the Republicans accomplished in 2005 and 2006
and the Democrats failed to do in 2007 and 2008. Other factors including the
President’s desires to enact some form of legislation on issues like defense spending, a
nuclear agreement with India, and trade relations with Peru allow Congress to draw out
concessions from the President, but what separates the Republican successes in 2005
and the Democratic failures in 2007 is the ability to gain enough support to override a
Presidential veto.
The conclusions one can draw about the Presidency of George W. Bush are not
limited to that time period alone because recent evidence concerning the current
administration of Barack Obama reveals the foundations for the trend to start again.
According to Stephen Weissman’s article in the Congressional newspaper, Roll Call,
titled Congress is Abdicating its Authority on Wars, Congress deferred to the popular
President Obama on several policies regarding the conduct of the war in Afghanistan
and the Afghan government.234 Congress remained uninvolved in the foreign policy of
President Obama and ignored messages from the American Embassy in Kabul,
Afghanistan expressing deep concern about the implications of the President’s
proposed surge in troop deployment to the country.235 These messages expressed
concerns about the uncalculated variables of committing more troops to Afghanistan
and the unreliability of the Afghan government.236 Afghan President Hamid Karzai
“continued to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden....and his government had
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little or no political will or capacity to carry out basic tasks over governance.” 237 Despite
poor political conditions and warnings from Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John
Kerry (D-MA), Obama proceeded to send thirty to thirty-four thousand more troops into
Afghanistan.238 Problems are now beginning to surface with President Obama’s
proposals, and if the Democrats lose seats after the 2010 elections, Congress might
reassert itself again as it did in 2005 against Bush, and challenge Obama on foreign
policy issues including the conduct of the war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan for Obama
will be analogous to Iraq for Bush and will drive members of Congress to reassert their
roles in the game of American foreign policy formation.
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